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4 April 1960

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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### DAILY BRIEF

#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

*OK*  
USSR-France: Soviet efforts to appear responsive to French views, while maintaining pressure for a German peace treaty, are reflected in the Khrushchev - De Gaulle communique and in Khrushchev's final remarks in France. Khrushchev attempted to demonstrate flexibility in agreeing to a "progressive settlement" of the German question on the basis of "agreements following negotiations." However, he sought to sharpen the warning of a separate German peace treaty by spelling out at his press conference the consequence of such action for the Western powers. The communique contains no evidence of changes in basic positions on East-West questions. Agreements were made to initiate new trade, cultural, and scientific exchanges, and for a return visit by De Gaulle.

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#### II. ASIA-AFRICA

*OK*  
Nepal-USSR: Nepal has accepted a Soviet offer to make a survey for a road across the southern plain, the full length of the country. The work will begin in October and take about a year. At present, east-west travel overland is by way of Indian territory. The acting prime minister conceded that acceptance of this Soviet offer makes it almost certain that the Russians will be permitted to build the road, should they so offer.

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(Map)

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*No*  
South Africa: Isolated anti-apartheid demonstrations continue in South Africa despite stringent security measures. The general strike has weakened in several areas, however, and in Johannesburg most Africans returned to work on 2 April. The embassy in Cape Town observes that if a majority of workers return to their jobs on Monday the disturbances may abate for the

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time being. The government is expected shortly to announce a revised system of identification passes, whereby Africans will have to produce documentation only on special occasions such as applications for employment.

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Thailand: The Thai Government is said to be considering official participation in a trade promotion tour of European bloc countries--possibly including the USSR--which now is being organized by influential Thai business leaders.

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OK [ ] Premier Sarit believes that government representation in the delegation should be sizable so that there would be no question that it was traveling with official approval. Sarit probably hopes this gesture will underscore his dissatisfaction with the level of United States economic and military aid.]

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

### Khrushchev - De Gaulle Talks

During his final round of talks with De Gaulle, Khrushchev apparently failed to gain any French commitments or concessions which would strengthen the Soviet position at the summit. The routine communiqué contains no evidence of changes in policy positions on either side. The Soviet leadership may feel, however, that it can utilize the communiqué's reference to the hope that the disarmament talks will reach "definite, agreed points of view on general and complete disarmament" to press the West to begin negotiating the specific measures in the Soviet plan. The reference to a mutual interest in "strengthening European security" may provide the USSR with an opening to renew proposals on this question at the summit. In his television address, Khrushchev specifically included European security in a list of the "most important international questions" and hinted that this could be a summit topic.

In his final public remarks the Soviet leader adopted a conciliatory and flexible attitude in attempting to appear responsive to French views. He limited his reference to the French atomic test to an expression of "regret," acknowledged the role of "Great France," and expressed the belief that his visit had strengthened his "optimism" over the summit. Khrushchev also attempted to demonstrate flexibility in dealing with major East-West issues by suggesting, facetiously, that disarmament might be solved in May and the Berlin problem "in June, for example." He appeared to accept the concept of protracted negotiations on the German and Berlin questions in the communiqué's statement recognizing a "progressive settlement of these questions on a basis agreed on through negotiations."

In his press conference, however, Khrushchev indicated that Moscow will continue to maintain pressure for a German settlement. In reiterating his threat to sign a separate peace treaty, he

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made it clear that the "consequence" would be the nullification of Allied rights. The timing of such action was left open and merely linked to a failure to reach an "understanding."

Agreements were signed on trade, scientific, and cultural exchange and on peaceful uses of atomic energy, and for a return visit by De Gaulle. The protocol on atomic energy provides for an exchange of scientists and for studies on exchanging equipment, techniques, and experience. New trade talks will be held this year to establish terms for 1963-65.

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
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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

### USSR to Conduct Major Survey for Nepalese East-West Road

Acting Prime Minister Subarna has confirmed press reports that Nepal has accepted a Soviet offer to make a detailed, year-long ground survey for an east-west road along the southern plain of the country. He said that although the new agreement covered only the detailed survey, scheduled to begin in October, Nepal's acceptance of this Soviet offer made it almost certain the Russians will be permitted also to build the road, should they so offer. Such a road would be a major engineering challenge and have vast propaganda impact; new and extensive assistance would be required.

The Russians made a preliminary survey last year. Reports at the time indicated the King had been impressed with their efficiency and was pressing Prime Minister Koirala to accede to the Soviet offer of a more complete survey. The concept of such an east-west road, running from border to border a distance of more than 550 miles, has long been desired by Nepal's rulers. East-west travel overland now requires the use of Indian territory to the south of Nepal.

The cost of the new survey, like the preliminary study, will probably be met from funds available under a \$7,500,000 grant-aid agreement signed in April 1959.

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Thai Government May Participate in Trade Promotion Tour  
Of Eastern European Bloc Countries

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[The reported plans of the Thai Government to participate officially in a trade promotion tour of the European satellites--now being organized by the chairman of the Thai Chamber of Commerce--is probably inspired more by dissatisfaction with American aid than by any hopes of developing significant new trade with the Communists.]

[Thai officials in recent weeks have become increasingly critical of the United States--especially American plans to sell PL-480 rice to India, slow delivery of military equipment, and what Thailand considers a disproportionate amount of aid given neutralist Cambodia and India. A trade gesture toward the Communists, together with the recent reported Thai decision to permit reopening of the TASS agency office in Bangkok, would seem designed to pressure the United States into adopting a more generous attitude. Premier Sarit, stanchly pro-US, has long been embarrassed by the coincidence that American aid has declined since he took over the government a year and a half ago.]

[The tour promoter believes that Sarit's active interest is all the approval he needs now to begin preparations for the trip, which he hopes can be completed in time to permit the delegation to leave Bangkok this month. Several prominent potential members of the delegation have allegedly expressed interest in including the Soviet Union on the itinerary.]

[Growing irritation with the United States as well as the desire to speed Thailand's economic development program may tempt Premier Sarit to a closer examination of the USSR's continuing offers of low-interest aid loans to any interested Asian nation.]

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